Following the oil price booms of the 1970s, Indonesia used part of its export revenue windfall to finance improvements in basic physical and human capital and efficiency-enhancing policy reforms. These helped produce a decade of rapid growth from the mid-1980s; during this time the economy successfully diversified its export base into a wide range of basic manufactures. In the 2000s, rapid growth of the Chinese and regional economy delivered Indonesia another decade of buoyant resource export earnings, and once again, the country the challenge of investing resource rents in endowments and policies that will sustain growth in the long term. The challenge has been made more difficult by structural changes associated with the Asian crisis, Dutch Disease, and some poorly conceived economic policy reversals. This paper focuses on the effects of these changes on the structure of employment and incentives for human capital investments. In data on occupations, employment arrangements and measures of inherent ability as well as recorded education, there is evidence of boom-related changes in the structure of labor demand which, for lower-income workers, reduce returns to investments in education, and increase returns to cognitive and non-cognitive abilities acquired in early childhood. These imply downward influence on trends in the demand for schooling that may reduce the impact of public investments aimed at increasing schooling supply. They may also help us to better understand the structural origins of recent increases in economic inequality.
Indonesian growth and structural change in the 2000s
In the 1980s, manufacturing's share of Indonesian GDP increased from 13% to 20%, and its share of exports from 3% to 35%.
2 At their peak in 2000, manufactures accounted for 29% of GDP and 57% of exports. In the subsequent decade, they declined again, by 2012 falling to 24% of GDP and 34% of exports -the same as their levels in 1993-94. The drop in manufacturing's annual growth rate was dramatic, from an average 12. 4% in 1980-96, 5 .4% per year faster than overall GDP, to just 4.7% in 2001-12, 0.7% slower than GDP.
The growth of manufacturing's share of GDP is expected to be non-linear, as with rising wealth, skillintensive services become increasingly important sources of comparative advantage and income. But the timing, pace and extent of the decline in Indonesia appears unusual. This is evident from Figure 1 , which plots manufacturing share of GDP against the log of per capita income for a comparable group of East and Southeast Asian economies. Indonesia (shown in red) undergoes a dramatic increase, and then an equally dramatic decline. Since we lack a counterfactual against which to evaluate these trends, it's important to try to see them in context. One comparison is with the pre-crisis period in Indonesia itself, and just discussed. Another reference point is data from comparable neighboring economies such as Thailand, Malaysia and the Philippines (e.g., Aswicahyono, Hill and Narjoko 2011). Indonesia's GDP growth rate has been roughly similar, and its industrial slowdown has been approximately matched in Thailand. But Indonesia's manufacturing industries never reached a comparable share of GDP, or employment, nor attained anything like the level of productivity or technical sophistication seen in neighboring economies (Coxhead and Li 2008) , and its average per capita income remains well below theirs.
Slow growth in manufacturing relative to overall GDP appears to have more than one cause. It is likely to be due in part to the after-effects of a large and sustained drop in investment during the Asian crisis. From 1970-96, the stock of machinery and equipment grew at around 8% per year and investment averaged about 30% of GDP. In 1997-2001 investment fell to 21% of GDP and did not re-attain its pre-crisis rate until 2007. Moreover, growth of total capital stock in the 2000s was led by construction, particularly nonresidential construction, rather than by manufacturing capital (van der Eng 2009, Figure 4 ). Public investments in infrastructure also fell far behind the pace required to maintain an efficient economy.
Inefficient and unreliable ports, roads and traffic management, and electricity supply all now have a large impact on manufacturing sector costs. 3 Thus growth of physical capital per worker (excluding construction) was very low, or even negative, over the decade 1998-2007.
Other flaws in economic structure and management have arguably contributed to diminished employment and wage growth. In the post-democratization era, momentum in economic reform, including liberalization of trade and foreign investment policies, has been lost (Wihardja 2013 ). There has been backtracking and ambivalence on FDI regulations and divestment, and even on trade policy-including a recent decision to impose export taxes on unprocessed natural resource products. Labor market regulations-already very restrictive by regional standards (World Bank 2013) have been tightened, including moves to raise minimum wages in organized sectors and to impose controls that make hiring and firing more costly. On social policy, spending has increased, most especially on education, but 3 Shipping turnaround times and container "dwell times" in Indonesia's major port, Tanjung Priok, are very high relative to international competitors, and the Jakarta metropolitan area, which houses a large fraction of national industrial production and employment, suffers heavily from traffic congestion (ADB 2013). In addition, disruptions due to electricity shortages, flooding and other infrastructure-related problems have become a major burden.
empirical studies do not find evidence that increased spending is mapping into improved educational outcomes (e.g. Suryadarma and Jones 2013; Newhouse and Suryadarma 2011) . Nor is public spending on education high by regional standards (Phan and Coxhead 2014) .
Finally, Indonesia has without doubt suffered in the 2000s from Dutch Disease (Thee 2011) . A resource boom in a small trade-dependent economy, while increasing income, is expected to reduce profits, activity levels and employment in non-resource tradable sectors such as manufacturing, and increase them in non-tradable sectors (broadly, services). The prices of the former industries will also fall relative to those of the latter. The factor market implications of Dutch Disease are not unambiguous, but theory leads us to expect that real returns to factors used intensively in non-booming sectors will fall, while returns to more mobile factors (commonly, unskilled labor) may rise or fall depending on the extent of real appreciation.
A brief consideration of theory also indicates that many of the effects of these three putative causes of manufacturing decline are correlated. A resource export boom, an investment collapse and the tightening of labor market and other industrial regulations should all reduce profits, activity levels and employment in manufacturing sectors. If physical and human capital are complements in production (e.g. Griliches
1969
) then a diminished rate of manufacturing sector investment also reduces growth in demand for skilled workers. Of course, an important contrast between an export boom and an investment collapse or increased level of distortion in the labor market is that the former raises total income, whereas the latter two reduce it. It is therefore clear that among these three influences on Indonesia's manufacturing growth, the resource export boom has been dominant.
If the slowdown in manufacturing growth is more than temporary, does it matter? One reason that it might is because manufacturing, more than most industries, is characterized by technological dynamism, learning by doing, informational spillovers and other sources of externalities that promote economic growth by making capital and other factors more productive (Hanson 2012 A second way in which slow manufacturing growth affects the aggregate economy is through its effects on the demand for labor, and specifically the demand for human capital. The "lagging" sectors in a Dutch
Disease-affected economy are those where profitability (and thus investment incentives) become trapped between rising domestic costs and output prices that are fixed in world markets. Some agricultural subsectors are vulnerable in this way, and so is much of manufacturing, the most skill-intensive and technologically dynamic sector. In the absence of countervailing policies, therefore, a sustained resource export boom will tend to reduce growth of "good" (i.e. skilled) jobs and will lower returns to education, especially at more advanced levels. This in turn exerts downward pressure on enrolment, retention and graduation rates at upper secondary school and tertiary levels, especially as rising labor demand in lowskill industries increases the opportunity cost of schooling. In the long term the economy may be less well positioned to make the transition to growth based on skills and innovation-that is, to transition into and through middle income, since this has been shown to depend greatly on improving educational attainment at secondary and tertiary levels (Eichengreen, Park and Shin 2013) . And finally, since education is in nearly all economies the most important pathway to economic mobility, lower returns to schooling are associated with rising income inequality, another striking feature of Indonesia's economy since 2001 (Yusuf 2013) . In Indonesia, the gradient of schooling attainment rates from lowest to highest income quintile is steep, by comparison with neighboring countries such as Thailand and Vietnam (Phan and Coxhead 2014) .
Structural change and demand for schooling
In the past decade Indonesia has invested heavily in increasing access to education. But low rates of educational upgrading may not be due to supply constraints alone. Changes in the country's international trading position and in the structure of domestic final demand may be contributing to diminished demand for education as well. In particular, China's emergence as "factory to the world" in the 1990s changed the terms of trade for other developing-country manufacturers, especially those based in economies (such as Indonesia) with low initial resources of skills and high initial endowments of natural resources (Eichengreen and Tong 2005; Coxhead 2007 ). Longer-term, the loss of trade-based growth opportunities in manufacturing industries, accompanied by a boom in resource exports and in non-traded industries, may have inhibited Indonesia's potential to take advantage of the trend toward globally distributed manufacturing (or "fragmentation"). The risk is now high that electronics, machinery and other products that are "made in the world" may not be made in Indonesia (Coxhead and Li 2008; Coxhead and Jaysuriya 2010) . The loss of momentum in manufacturing, the most technologically dynamic and skillintensive sector that is accessible by most workers, may in turn be linked to declining rates of return to educational investments.
Changing structure of employment and real wages: a look at the data
As with manufacturing output, Indonesia's patterns of nonfarm employment growth have begun to diverge from the typical developing country case. Trends in the sectoral composition of employment and real wages may be linked. Informal employment arrangements are prevalent in Indonesia, but less so in manufacturing than in agriculture or services.
Expansion of service sector jobs thus means more workers in informal employment --other things equal.
While it is possible that some workers opt for informal employment (and especially self-employment) as a means to build a business or a more flexible career, it is more typically true that jobs in informal services provide a "sink" for workers who would otherwise be recorded as unemployed or underemployed.
There are some indications that this is the case during the 2000s. From 1997 to 2007, median earnings of workers in private wage employment in domestic trade and personal services remained roughly constant relative to those in manufacturing, while the relative earnings of self-employed workers fell sharply (Table 1 ). The fall in relative returns to self-employment is inconsistent with positive selection of workers into self-employment in order to advance their careers. Third, in spite of public commitments to educational reform and a new constitution that committed government to spend not less than 20% of its budget on education, there has been comparatively little progress on educational infrastructure or the quality of schooling (Suryadarma and Jones, eds, 2013 ).
Indonesia's labor force is poorly by international standards: the country is close to the bottom of many global comparisons of educational achievement. 5 The recent resource export boom era has resulted in no discernible catch-up relative to slower-growing economies.
Fourth, economic returns to education in Indonesia are low, and unusually among Asian developing countries, have actually declined since the pre-crisis era (Purnastuti et al 2013; Coxhead 2014) . This trend, also, is inconsistent with the typical experience of low-middle income countries. We explore the dimensions and reasons for this phenomenon in more detail in the next section.
Structural change in labor markets: empirical analysis
As discussed, Indonesia's post-boom job growth has been strong in services and weak in manufacturing and other tradables. What does it mean to a worker to take up employment in one of these industries instead of another? In this section we ask how changes in the structure of labor demand are affecting earnings, job security, returns to skills and other factors likely to influence long-term economic wellbeing.
Data, and definitions of key variables
We use data from recent rounds of the Indonesian Family Life Survey (IFLS). We use data on men and women of working age (15-65) and only those in the labor force at the time of interview. In 2007 this was 78% of men and 42% of women surveyed (Table 2) . Of those not working, 8% of men and 7% of women were attending school; 3% of men and 47% of women were engaged in housekeeping, and smaller percentages were searching for a job, retired, invalids, or otherwise out of the labor force. In order to estimate determinants of earnings, we fit modified earnings equations (Mincer 1974) to the data. Initially, we restrict attention to the most recent data, from IFLS4. This gives us a picture of determinants of variation in earnings in 2007, well after the end of the Asian crisis era and firmly into the resource export boom period. Table 3 summarizes the main variables used in estimation.
Earnings are measured as the log of monthly labor income in rupiah. We measure education by the number of years reported. 7 Tenure is the number of years an individual reports having held a specific job.
Experience is reported as years in the labor force. In order to allow for diminishing returns, both these variables also enter in quadratic form. Urban, Sumatra and OtherIndo are dummies for urban location, Sumatra, and other Indonesia (the excluded category is Java). Hours per year are calculated from reported hours in paid work for the reporting period. Finally, our earnings function estimation strategy includes both pooled data with controls for sector and occupation, and also separate estimates by occupation. Selection into a particular occupation is partly endogenous, and empirical studies frequently deal with this by pooling data and including occupation controls. In a developing country context, however, there seem to be several complications to this. One is that since occupations are not equally represented among sectors (there are few white-collar jobs in agriculture, for example), the changing sectoral structure of labor demand also implies a changing set of occupational choices. Second, there may be significant barriers to occupational choice-in part because of exogenous factors (to the adult) such as location, ethnicity, and childhood nutrition, health and socioeconomic status. Third, informal employment arrangements, as discussed above, are far more prevalent is some occupations than in others.
As an estimation strategy, fitting earnings functions separately by occupation gives us a quantitative sense of the differences among them and provides a window into determinants of variation in earnings power within each occupational group, conditional on selection into that group. This comes at a cost, since estimating earnings separately by occupation imparts a downward bias to the earnings contributions of factors that facilitate entry by some workers into higher-paying occupations while constraining others to less rewarding activities (Case et al., 2009 ). Construction of a completely integrated model of constrained occupational choice by heterogeneous workers is a more complex task and the subject of ongoing work.
Employment, earnings and returns to schooling during the boom
We now turn to estimates of the 2007 earnings functions, using the log of monthly earnings as dependent variable. We obtain these estimates by OLS. This method leaves unaddressed the possibility of estimation bias due to non-random selection into the labor force. In practice, however, prior estimation of earnings and employment functions using IFLS data has revealed no significant differences between estimates obtained from OLS and those obtained from two-stage models accounting for selection into the labor force. See Purnastuti et al. 2013 for a review of these studies. Our regressions control for many exogenous characteristics of individuals in the hope that any remaining variation due to unobserved traits has only random effects on earnings. Table 5 shows results of the earnings regressions. The first column shows estimates for all workers, and subsequent columns show results conditional on occupation (occupational definitions are from IFLS).
Results for controls such as experience, tenure, location and sector are suppressed to save space. Most results are strongly intuitive and are broadly consistent with comparable studies. Among the findings, the following are of particular relevance.
First, unconditional earnings (the intercepts of the earnings functions) vary greatly, with services the lowest by a long way. Earnings are appreciably (and in almost all cases significantly) higher for workers in urban areas, and for males. Moreover, formal employment contracts are highly valuable. Across all occupations, formal employment increases earnings by 31.3%, and the magnitude of this gain is broadly similar across the individual occupations.
Second, the marginal earnings gain of an additional year of education averages 6.5% across all occupations, taking account of occupational and educational choices and controlling for other factors such as region, tenure, experience and sector. This rate of return corresponds with other estimates from Indonesian data (e.g. Purnastuti et al. 2011) , though all of these estimates are somewhat lower than those for broader samples of developing countries (Psacharopoulos and Patrinos 2004) . 8 Across occupations, however, there is wide variation, with additional schooling worth most to workers who find employment in professional and clerical jobs, and least to those who work in agriculture, services or blue-collar 8 The lower estimate of returns to education was also found in similar data from Vietnam, another resourcedependent low-income Asian economy (Phan and Coxhead 2013). production work. For most Indonesian workers the relevant non-farm occupational choices are between blue-collar or production line work, sales, or services. Among these choices, returns to additional schooling in manufacturing (7.7% for production line workers and 8.8% for semi-skilled workers) are considerably higher than for the other occupations. Structural changes that increase labor demand in nontradable activities (services and sales) relative to production work thus lower the expected returns on schooling investments, other things equal. As the probability of employment in sales or services occupations increases, young adults have less incentive to remain in school or proceed to the next level of education.
Third, adult height is significant and positive in the pooled data: greater cognitive and non-cognitive abilities (for which adult height is an instrument) make a substantial contribution to higher earnings, taking account of their effects on decisions over schooling, sector and occupation. However, most occupations display no significant within-group variation: conditional on occupational choice, unmeasured abilities do not contribute to higher earnings except indirectly, for example through schooling outcomes. The big exception is services, where the effect of height is both very large and highly significant. In this occupational category, each 1% increase in height increases earnings by 1.1%. Male height in Indonesia averages 162cm with a standard deviation of 6.5cm, so a male of height one standard deviation above the mean earns almost 10% more than one who is one standard deviation shorter than average. This is true even if they both have the same education, terms of employment and other conditions-all of which, plus the probability of working in services versus another occupation, are themselves subject to influence from height differences. Thus the 10% difference is unambiguously a lower bound estimate. Early childhood health and nutrition-the key determinants of adult height differentials-remain very strong influences over earnings in the Indonesian labor market.
The foregoing analysis focuses only on a single year of data. In related work, we examine trends across pre-and post-crisis waves of the IFLS, comparing the labor market fortunes by age cohort (Coxhead 2014) .
That work reveals that returns to education are low not only in certain occupations, but also for younger workers. Low returns are especially evident for workers with informal labor contracts. Returns to education for young workers (15-28 years old in 2007) in informal employment were dismally low at just 1.4-3.9%, compared with 3.6-7% for workers in older cohorts. Finally, returns to schooling declined from rates broadly comparable with other developing counties in 1997, to rates significantly lower by 2007.
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Other things equal, lower probability of employment in high-skill industries reduces students' incentives to stay in school beyond the legal minimum age. Moreover, the higher is the probability of informal sector employment, the lower is their expectation of returns on human capital investments. Both of these probabilities appear to have fallen in Indonesia between 1997 and 2007, in spite of sustained and rapid growth of the aggregate economy in the post-crisis years.
Discussion and conclusions
The Indonesian economy has grown steadily since 2001. However, its labor markets show a contradictory trend, notably a rising share of employment in industries characterized by low labor productivity and prevalent informality of labor contracts; low and declining returns to education, and in the fastest-growing occupational group, persistently large returns to individual characteristics associated with early childhood health and nutrition. The causes of these changes in labor demand are overdetermined, being consistent with the expected effects of the crisis-era drop in investment, a natural resource export boom, and policies tending to reduce labor market flexibility and increase trade protectionism. The relative contribution of each of these influences is a matter for further research. What is far more important, however, is that that these labor market trends are much less easily reconciled with those to be expected in an economy making a sustained transition from low income and resource dependence to industrialization and middle income, with the accompanying rise of industries built on investments in capital, technology and skills.
The history of economic development confirms that sustained and rapid economic growth is most easily achieved through technological dynamism and a matching increase in the skills of the labor force.
Together, these are forces powerful enough to overcome other deficiencies that undermine growth:
"formal manufacturing industries are natural 'escalator' industries that tend to propel an economy forward, even in the presence of bad governance, bad policies and a disadvantageous context" (Rodrik 2013:27) .
Manufacturing growth, in those developing economies that pursue their comparative advantage, is also a fast track to higher employment and labor productivity.
In an analysis of labor market data, we find that the areas of economic activity showing greatest growth are also those in which returns to education and skills are relatively low. Young Indonesians, perceiving a lower probability of employment in sectors or occupations where schooling commands a higher premium, are likely to reduce their planned educational investments as a result. Policies intended to increase enrollments, retention, and graduation rates at secondary and tertiary levels by increasing the supply of schooling thus face the additional obstacle of weaker growth in educational demand.
The solution to low incentive to increase education and skills acquisition must rest with a mix of macro, micro and fiscal policies. To the extent that structural change in labor demand reflects the lingering aftereffects of the Asian Crisis-era investment collapse, there is little to be done but wait. But if low educational demand growth is a long-run consequence of a natural resource export boom, then the Indonesian government would benefit by carefully considering the optimal combination of sterilization and investment policies required to re-stimulate growth in manufacturing and other non-resource tradables. Finally, the evidence strongly suggests that it is time for the Indonesian government to carefully examine policies on education, training, industrial promotion, trade and foreign investment in order to forestall unintended consequences that may impair long-run growth. 
